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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 09-1433

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GARY HAILE,
Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
(D.C. Crim. No. 08-cr-00117-001)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 12, 2010

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, BARRY and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: February 8, 2010)

OPINION

BARRY, Circuit Judge
Appellant Gary Haile argues that the District Court erred by improperly delegating
authority to the probation officer to decide whether or not Haile should receive a mental

health evaluation and treatment as a condition of supervised release. Because the Court
was clear that it would make the ultimate decision as to whether a mental health
evaluation and treatment would be necessary, we will affirm.
BACKGROUND
Haile pled guilty to a one-count information charging him with Hobbs Act
robbery, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951-52. At his sentencing hearing on January 14, 2009, the
District Court imposed a sentence of 168 months’ imprisonment, as well as a three-year
term of supervised release. (App. at 39-40.) This appeal challenges the following
statement of the Court made while imposing conditions of supervised release:
At the direction of your probation officer, you shall undergo a mental health
evaluation and follow the recommendations of that evaluation; including
participation in anger management or cognitive therapy. Now, there’s a
new case that says that probation officers are not to be charged in essence
with that responsibility. It’s a non-precedential case. I’m not sure what that
means. I want the record to reflect that the judge will personally supervise
the need for that mental health evaluation and any cognitive therapy
imposed.”
(Id. at 41.) Haile did not object at sentencing to this statement or to any of the conditions
of supervised release. The amended judgment1 issued on February 11, 2009 included a
requirement that “Defendant shall undergo a mental health evaluation and follow the
recommendations of the evaluation, including participation in anger management or
cognitive behavioral therapy.” (Id. at 53.)
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The judgment had been amended to correct a clerical error. (App. at 50.)
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Haile appealed. He argues that “the District Court improperly delegated judicial
authority to the probation officer.” (Appellant’s Br. at 3.) He “seeks a remand with
directions to vacate the mental health condition.” (Id.)
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The parties agree that our review is
for plain error. United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 143 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007); United
States v. Warren, 186 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999).
DISCUSSION
Not surprisingly, the parties offer different interpretations of the challenged
statement of the District Court. On the one hand, Haile argues that the Court delegated the
decision about whether he should receive a mental health evaluation and treatment; on the
other hand, the government insists that the Court was clear in its instruction that Haile
“was required to undergo a mental health evaluation and treatment.” (Appellee’s Br. at
10.)
In United States v. Pruden, we labored to strike the appropriate balance between
two competing imperatives: namely, the “most important limitation . . . that a probation
officer may not decide the nature or extent of the punishment imposed upon a
probationer” and the reality that “courts cannot be expected to map out every detail of a
defendant’s supervised release.” 398 F.3d 241, 250 (3d Cir. 2005). To achieve this
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balance, we adopted the following standard, which we recently reaffirmed in United
States v. Heckman, __ F.3d __, 2010 WL 59185, at *7 (3d Cir. 2010):
If [the defendant] is required to participate in a mental health intervention
only if directed to do so by his probation officer, then this special condition
constitutes an impermissible delegation of judicial authority to the probation
officer. On the other hand, if the District Court was intending nothing more
than to delegate to the probation officer the details with respect to the
selection and schedule of the program, such delegation was proper.
Pruden, 398 F.3d at 250 (quoting United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir.
2001)).
It would be wrong to characterize the District Court’s statement as requiring Haile
to participate in a mental health evaluation and subsequent treatment only if the Probation
Office determined it was necessary. In stating that it would “supervise the need for it,”
the Court made clear that it retained control over the decision. App. at 41; see Heckman,
2010 WL 59185, at *8. Moreover, the language of the judgment order gives no discretion
to the Probation Office, as it unequivocally states that “the defendant shall undergo a
mental health evaluation and follow the recommendations of the evaluation.” 2 (App. at
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Our decision in Heckman is instructive. There, the district court stated: “The
defendant shall participate in a mental health program for evaluation and/or treatment as
directed by the United States Probation Office. The defendant shall remain in treatment
until satisfactorily discharged and with the approval of the United States Probation
Office.” 2010 WL 59185, at *7. We found that this was not an improper delegation
because the second sentence – instructing that Heckman “shall remain in treatment . . .” –
cleared up any ambiguity caused by the sentence that preceded it and “naturally read as
requiring mandatory treatment and thus limiting the Probation Office’s discretion.” Id. at
*8.
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53.)
Thus, because the Court’s oral and written instructions demonstrate that it retained
authority over the need for an evaluation and treatment, it did not commit error, much less
plain error, in imposing the special condition of supervised release at issue in this appeal.
See Heckman, 2010 WL 59185, at *8 (finding permissible delegation where
“[p]articipation in the mental health treatment program itself is mandatory, and only the
details are to be set by the Probation Office”).
CONCLUSION
The judgment of sentence will be affirmed.
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